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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellant, : Case No. 20010315-CA 
v. : 
ALAN KAY JUSTESEN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellee. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State appeals from the district court's dismissal of charges of driving under 
the influence, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (1998 & 
Supp. 2000); driving on suspended license, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 53-3-277 (1998); and giving false information to a peace officer, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-507 (1999) (Rl-2). 
This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-18a-
l(2)(a) (1999), 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Did the trial court err as a matter of law in holding that a Fourth 
Amendment seizure occurred solely because the sergeant illuminated the darkened 
roadside area around the minivan with his stationary take-down lights? 
A "bifurcated" review standard applies. The trial court's underlying fact findings 
are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The trial court's 
conclusions of law, however, are reviewed for correctness, allowing some "measure of 
discretion" as regards the application of legal standards to the facts. See State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah 1994); State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245, 1247 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah 1996). 
These issues are preserved by the parties' argument and the district court's ruling 
(R44:29-45)(R12-14). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence, a third degree felony, 
driving on suspended license, a class B misdemeanor, and giving false information to a 
peace officer, a class C misdemeanor (Rl-2). Defendant moved to suppress evidence of 
his intoxication on the ground that he was illegally detained (R. 7-8) (a copy of the 
motion is contained in addendum A). Following an evidentiary hearing on 21 
November 2000 (R44) (a copy of the hearing transcript is contained in addendum B), 
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the trial court granted defendant's motion (R12-14) (a copy of the Ruling is contained in 
addendum C). 
Because the State was unable to proceed without the suppressed evidence, the trial 
court dismissed the information with prejudice (R21). The State filed a timely notice of 
appeal (R23). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State does not dispute, as far as they go, the facts as found by the trial court, 
reproduced here with supporting citations to the record inserted: 
• Sergeant Tom Stefanoff of the Carbon County Sheriffs 
Department was patrolling Airport Road about one mile 
northeast of the airport at 12:45 a.m. on June 17, 2000, when 
he noticed a white 1991 Ford minivan parked several feet off 
the paved road [(R12), add. C; (R44:4-6), add. B1]. 
• Because the area is somewhat isolated, Stefanoff pulled in 
and stopped 6*-8' behind the vehicle [(R12), add. C; (R44:4), 
add. B]. 
• Defendant had no physical obstruction in front of his vehicle that 
would have prevented him from leaving [(R14), add. C; (R44:14), 
add. B] 
• Seeing no lights or anyone in the van, he activated the white "take-
down" lights in the light bar on the top of his patrol vehicle, exited 
lSgt. Stefanoff discovered the minivan approximately one mile "past the airport," 
near a gravel pit (R44:11,13), add. B. Continuing on the road in this direction leads to a 
mine in Deadman Canyon (id.). 
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his vehicle, and observed the brake lights of the van turn on [(R12), 
add. C; (R44:7-8, 13-14), add. B2]. 
He did not activate his red and blue flashing lights [(R12), add. C; 
(R44:15),add.Bj. 
[T]he lights activated by the officer were not the familiar red and blue 
flashing lights, but were in the nature of two white spotlights on the top of 
the officer's vehicle which had the effect of illuminating the surrounding 
immediate area [(R13), add. C (emphasis added); (R44:15), add. B3]. 
He (Sgt. Stefanoff) approached the driver's window and observed 
the defendant sitting in the van with the keys in the ignition, 
although the engine was not running [(R12), add. C; (R44:8-9), 
add. B] 
Stefanoff asked the defendant for some LD. and the defendant 
responded that his name was Steve Templeton but that he had no 
LD. [(R12), add. C; (R44:9), add. B]. 
Stefanoff smelled a distinctive odor of an alcoholic beverage 
emanating from the defendant's person, and the defendant stated 
that he had had a few drinks [(R12), add. C; (R44:9), add. B4]. 
2There was no artificial light in this remote area and no light from the minivan, so 
Sgt. Stefanoff "used [his] take-down lights- -two white lights on the top of [his] vehicle 
to illuminate the area . . . [f]or officer safety reasons," so that he could determine "what's 
[sic] going on" (id.). These spotlights are called take-down lights because "[t [hat's the 
name the light bar company gave them" (R44:15), add. B. Take-down lights are used to 
illuminate dark areas and their use does not necessarily indicate police are "taking 
anybody down"(R44:24), add. B. 
3Sgt. Stefanoff uses his red and blue rotating lights to effect a traffic slop, and the 
spot or take-down lights are only activated at the scene, if needed for illumination 
(R44:16),add.B. 
4Sgt. Stefanoff smelled alcohol as he walked to the driver's side where he 
observed that the window was rolled down (R44:8-9), add. B. After defendant admitted 
drinking, Sgt. Stefanoff asked him to step out for field sobriety tests (R44:10), add. B. 
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• Stefanoff testified that at the time he approached the van he did not 
suspect that anyone had committed a crime, that he had no 
reasonable suspicion to believe anyone had committed a crime, and 
that the van was not parked illegally [(R13), add. C; (R44:18), add. 
B]. 
• He further testified that he stopped behind the van for the purpose of 
determining whether someone needed assistance or whether the van 
was abandoned [(R13), add. C; (R44:6), add. B5]. 
• The defendant was arrested for [d]riving under the [i]nfluence of 
[a]lcohol, [d]riving on a denied license, and giving false [p]ersonal 
[information to a [pjolice [o]fficer, all misdemeanors [(R13), add. 
C;(R44:10),add.B]. 
(R12-13),add.C.6 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Under the totality of the circumstances, Sgt. Stefanoff s action in illuminating the 
darkened roadside with his white take-down lights did not, by itself, amount to a seizure. 
The undisputed evidence establishes that the sergeant merely sought to illuminate the 
area—an eminently reasonable safety precaution—before approaching to investigate why 
the mini van was parked off the road, in an isolated area, in the middle of the night 
Moreover, no recognized indicia of seizure was present. The sergeant did not activate 
his flashing emergency red and blue lights, park his patrol car so as to block the minivan, 
5Sgt Stefanoff "pulled behind the van to check the welfare of any people that may 
be in there, to see if it was broken, to see if somebody needed assistance in getting their 
car repaired or if they needed a ride back or maybe a phone to get some assistance to help 
them with their broken-down vehicle, of if it was abandoned and they just left it there. 
Just wanted to make sure it was okay" (id.). 
6Defendant elected not to testify or to call any witnesses (R44:28), add. B. 
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or order defendant to remain. Rather, Sgt. Stefanoff approached in a non-threatening 
manner using neither weapon nor tone of voice to indicate compliance might be 
compelled. Based on these undisputed facts, the trial court's conclusion that a seizure 
occurred when the sergeant activated the stationary take-down lights is erroneous and 
should be overturned. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT A 
FOURTH AMENDMENT SEIZURE OCCURRED SOLELY 
BECAUSE THE SERGEANT ILLUMINATED THE DARK 
ROADSIDE AROUND THE POTENTIALLY ABANDONED 
MINIVAN WITH STATIONARY SPOTLIGHTS 
The trial court found a seizure occurred solely because Sgt. Stefanoff illuminated 
the dark roadside with his white non-emergency take-down lights (R1314), add. C. In 
so concluding, the trial court erred as a matter of law: Sgt. Stefanoff s action constituted 
a prudent safety measure before approaching the mini van he found inexplicably parked 
off the side of the road, in an isolated area, in the middle of the night (R44:4-8), add. B. 
See United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United 
States v. Alexander, 907 F.2d 269, 272 (2nd Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1095 
(1991) ("A law enforcement agent faced with the possibility of danger, has a right to take 
reasonable steps to protect himself [or herseli] ")• The Sergeant's ensuing encounter 
with defendant thus began not as a seizure, but as a "level one," or non-seizure, police-
6 
citizen encounter. State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984 (Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. 
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)). 
A. There Are No Indicia of Seizure Present During the 
Initial Level One Police-Citizen Encounter Here. 
Under Terry v. Ohio, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968), and its progeny, there are three levels 
of police-citizen encounters. Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. The first level is a non-seizure 
which occurs when, as here, an officer approaches and questions a suspect. "[A] seizure 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment does not occur when a police officer merely 
approaches an individual on the street and questions him, if the person is willing to 
listen." Id. (citation omitted). The second level is reached when an officer temporarily 
seizes a person "6by means of physical force or show of authority'" which "'in some way 
restraints] the liberty of a person.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Men den hall, 446 U.S. 
544, 552 (1980). In order to legally effect a temporary seizure, the officer must have 
"articulable suspicion" that the suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime, and 
the detention must be limited in scope. Id. Because the question here is whether the 
instant encounter escalated from a voluntary encounter to a seizure, as a matter of law, 
when the sergeant activated his take-down lights, only these first two levels are critical to 
the analysis.7 
7The third level is arrest, which requires probable cause for the officer to believe 
that a crime has been or is about to be committed. Id. 
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A seizure occurs when, "taking into account all of the circumstances surrounding 
the encounter, the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that 
he was not at liberty to ignore police presence and go about his business." Florida v. 
Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435 (1991). In Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555, the United States 
Supreme Court discussed examples of circumstances "that might indicate a seizure, even 
where the person did not attempt to leave." They include the following: 
• the threatening presence of several officers, 
• the display of a weapon by an o fficer, 
• some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or 
• the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the 
officer's request might be compelled. 
Id. None of these indicia are present here. 
Indeed, the trial court erroneously found that a seizure occurred the moment the 
sergeant activated his take-down lights, even before Sgt. Stefanoff became aware anyone 
was inside the minivan (R13-14), add. C. The trial court so ruled even though it also 
found that defendant was not otherwise subjected to any indicia of seizure: 
The court finds that the defendant had no physical 
obstruction in front of his vehicle that would have prevented 
him from leaving. Furthermore, the lights activated by the 
officer were not the familiar red and blue flashing lights, but 
were in the nature of two white spotlights on the top of the 
officer's vehicle which had the effect of illuminating the 
surrounding immediate area. 
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Although there were no physical obstructions in front 
of defendant's vehicle that would have prevented him from 
leaving, the take-down lights were extremely bright and were 
on the top of the vehicle, and given the time of night and the 
isolated location, the court finds that a reasonable person 
would think that the activation of the take-down lights meant 
that they were intended as a display of authority and that he 
was not free to leave. It is significant also that under Utah 
law, a non-emergency vehicle would not be able to approach 
defendant and shine their lights on the defendant as the 
officer did in this case. See [Utah Code Ann. §] 41-6-129d 
and 131. 
Because a reasonable person under the totality of the 
circumstances would have perceived that he was not free to 
leave, the court finds that the defendant was seized and that 
this was a level two stop that must be supported by an 
"articulable suspicion" that the defendant had committed or 
was about to commit a crime. However, Stefanoff testified 
that he did not suspect that the defendant had committed or 
was about to commit a crime. Consequently, he had no 
authority to "seize" the defendant by activating his take-down 
lights and engaging in conversation with the defendant at the 
van's window. Thus, the observations of the officer while at 
the defendant's window and the conversation between him 
and the defendant are not admissible in evidence. 
(R13-14),add.C. 
B. Illumination is an Eminently Reasonable Safety Precaution and 
Does Not By Itself Amount to a Show of Authority, Let Alone 
Seizure, for Fourth Amendment Purposes. 
The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have long 
recognized that illumination is often necessary so that police can see to investigate; 
consequently, illumination by itself does not amount to a search. United States v. Lee, 
214 U.S. 559, 563 (1927) (use of a searchlight held not to constitute a search within 
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment); State v. Lee, 633 P.2d 48, 52 (Utah) (holding use of 
flashlight to view automobile's interior constitutional), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 1057 
(1981).8 
Here, illumination was also necessary for the sergeant's safety (R44:8), add. B. 
As noted previously, police faced with the possibility of danger have a right to take 
reasonable steps to protect themselves. See Merkley, 988 F.2d at 1064. Sgt. Stefanoff s 
objective safety concern was real and reasonable. The United States Supreme Court has 
consistently recognized the danger facing police in these circumstances. In Maryland v. 
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997), the Supreme Court observed that '[i]n 1994 alone, 
there were 5,672 officer assaults and 11 officers killed during traffic pursuits and stops." 
The Supreme Court has previously noted that approximately 30% of police shootings 
occur when an officer approaches a suspect seated in a vehicle. Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032, 1049 n.13 (1983); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 n.5 
(1973) (FBI report indicates that 11 of 35 police officers murdered in a three-month 
8Given the Lee cases, the trial court's observation that it is illegal for a non-
emergency vehicle to shine a spotlight on another vehicle is of no consequence {see 
R14), add. C (citing UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 41-6-129(d), -131 (1998) ("Any lighted head 
lamps upon a parked vehicle shall be depressed or dimmed.... Any motor vehicle may 
be equipped with not to exceed two spot lamps and every lighted spot lamp shall be so 
aimed and used that no part of the high intensity portion of the beam will strike the 
windshield, or any windows, mirror, or occupant of another vehicle -in use. This section 
does not apply to spot lamps on authorized emergency vehicles.) (emphasis added)). 
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period were killed when the officers were making a traffic stop); 4 W. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure, § 9.5(a), 254-255 n.33 (3d. ed. 1996) (more officers are shot while 
conducting field interrogations than while dealing with known felons, and 43% of officer 
shootings occurred pursuant to a vehicle stop take place after the initial contact has been 
made). As tragically highlighted by recent events in this state, Utah law enforcement is 
not immune from the national trend. See Angie Welling, Officer's death shocks Lehi, 
Deseret News, August 5, 2001, at Al (a copy is attached as addendum D). See also 
State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, fflf 2-5, 994 P.2d 177 (passenger in traffic stop shot at 
officer after ignoring repeated requests to show his hands); State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 
1135,1137 (Utah 1989) (driver shot at officer without warning as officer approached 
vehicle). Given the grim statistics, this Court should be "loathe to create a situation in 
which officers would be discouraged from acting to help stranded motorists, from acting 
in the interest of safety of the traveling public, or from acting in the interest of their own 
safety." State v. Bald on ado, 847 P.2d 751, 753 (N.M. App. 1993), cert, denied, 848 
P.2d531(N.M. 1993). 
Moreover, the State is unaware of any authority holding that illumination of an 
area by police with stationary white light, by itself, constituted a show of authority 
sufficient to constitute a seizure. Rather, police action in illuminating an area with a 
spotlight, without an explicit verbal order to "stop," and/or otherwise blocking the 
suspect, is insufficient to constitute a seizure. United States v. Peoples, 925 F.2d 1082, 
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1084-1085 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 938 (1991). See also State v. Hunter, 783 
S.W.2d 493,495 (Mo. App. 1990) (rejecting defendant's claim that he was seized the 
moment police pulled up behind his car and activated take-down lights); State v. Young, 
957 P.2d 681, 688 (Wash. 1998) (holding that illumination by a spotlight did not amount 
to a show of authority for purposes of seizure, where the officer did not have his siren or 
emergency lights on and did not draw his weapon); State v. O'Neill, 17 P.3d 682, 689-
690 (Wash. App. 2001) (finding no seizure where officer did not activate his emergency 
lights, draw his weapon, or block defendant's access out of the parking lot). Cf. State v. 
Brechlin, 412 N.W.2d 367,369 (Minn. App. 1987) (holding that activation of "flashing 
red lights and 'take-down' lights" constituted seizure). 
While there is case support for the fact that "red lights," State v. Carpena, 714 
P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986), "a flashing red light," Malina v. Gonzalez, 994 F.2d 1121, 
1123,1126 (5th Cir. 1993), "flashing lights and siren," Horta v. Sullivan, 4 F.3d 2, 11 (Is 
Cir. 1993), or "flashing lights and continuing pursuit," Brower v. Inyo County, 489 U.S. 
593, 597 (1989), constitute a show of authority similar to an explicit verbal command, 
California v. HodariD., 499 U.S. 621, 628-629 (1991), they do not necessarily indicate 
seizure. Indeed, Hodari D. clarifies that a seizure does not occur if the subject does not 
yield to the show of authority. Id. at 626. Cf. Baldonado, 847 P.2d at 753 (recognizing 
there are circumstances in which people in stopped cars approached by officers flashing 
their lights would be free to leave because the officers would be simply communicating 
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with them to ascertain that they are not in trouble. . . the officers may well activate their 
emergency lights for reasons of highway safety or so as not to unduly alarm the stopped 
motorists"). In any event, Sgt. Stefanoff did not activate his red and blue flashing 
emergency lights or siren, thus, no circumstance giving rise to a show of authority, let 
alone seizure, is present here. 
State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1997), is consistent with the above 
authority and does not support the trial court's erroneous conclusion of a seizure on these 
facts. While this Court found that a seizure did occur in Struhs, the officer's use of high-
beam headlights and white take-down lights were not the sole indicia of seizure in that 
case. Id. at 1228. Rather, applying the totality of the circumstances, the Court's 
determination of seizure was also based on the Struhs officer's stealth and 
confrontational conduct; in particular, the Struhs officer turned off her lights before 
pulling "nose-to-nose" with Struh's vehicle and then suddenly activated her high-beam 
headlights and white take-down lights. Id. Given these circumstances, it is not at all 
clear that the Court would have found a seizure if the Struhs officer had approached in a 
non-confrontational manner similar to the sergeant in this case. Compare State v. Smith, 
781 P.2d 879, 882 n.3 (Utah App. 1989) (finding seizure where officer blocked the 
defendant's vehicle). 
Just as Struhs is distinguishable from the instant facts, so is State v. Davis, 821 
P.2d 9 (Utah App. 1991), upon which Struhs relies. 940 P.2d at 1228. The Court's 
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opinion in Davis does not clarify whether the "overhead lights" in Davis were stationary 
white lights, red and blue flashing emergency lights, or both. Id. at 12. ("The officer 
then detained Davis by a display of authority when he activated the overhead lights on 
his vehicle."). However, this Court can take judicial notice that the "overhead lights" in 
Davis were in fact red and blue flashing emergency lights because that was the Davis 
officer's suppression hearing testimony. See Davis, Case No. 910166-Ca, Aplt. Br. at 
addendum, p. 6 (the pertinent pages of the brief and addendum are attached as 
addendum E). See also Utah R. Evid. 201(b) ("A judicially noticed fact must be one 
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . .. capable of accurate and ready 
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned"). 
The Davis officer's use of his red and blue flashing emergency "overhead lights" is 
consistent with his intent to detain Davis for possible open container or D.U.I, violations. 
Id. at 12. 
Here, on the other hand, Sgt. Stefanoff did not even know if the minivan was 
occupied or abandoned when he illuminated the roadside area with his white take-down 
lights, and he did not, therefore, necessarily intend to detain any potential occupant 
(R44:23), add. B. To the contrary, the sergeant testified that if the minivan had 
thereafter driven away, he "would have [taken] it that the people were okay and the 
vehicle was fine and they were free to go" (id.), add. B. 
14 
Thus, at most defendant was arguably startled by the sergeant's activation of the 
illuminating take-down lights, but that does not mean that a reasonable person would 
feel, under the totality of the circumstances, that he or she was not free to leave. Bostick, 
501 U.S. at 435; Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. Indeed, defendant was already parked with his 
headlights off before the sergeant came upon the minivan and illuminated the area. And, 
as the trial court found, there is no evidence that the sergeant otherwise sought to detain 
defendant (R13), add. C. The sergeant did not activate his flashing emergency red and 
blue lights, did not park so as to block the minivan in any manner, and did not, once he 
became aware the minivan was occupied, order defendant to stay put (R13-14), add. C; 
{see R44:4-26), add. B. Rather, the evidence establishes that the sergeant approached 
the minivan in a non-threatening manner, without a displayed weapon or tone of voice 
indicating compliance might be compelled, nor did he touch defendant (R44:4-26), add. 
B. See MendenhalL 446 U.S. at 555. 
Thus, no indicia of seizure are present here and the trial court erred in ruling that 
the mere activation of stationary white take-down lights escalated an otherwise voluntary 
police-citizen encounter to a Fourth Amendment seizure. 
15 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, there are no recognized indicia of seizure here. The trial 
court's erroneous ruling to the contrary should be overruled and this case should be 
remanded for trial on the merits. 
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Defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime, and that said police officers 
had no such reasonable suspicion. 
Defendant requests that the Court set a date for hearing on Defendant's Motion 
at a time convenient to the Court and Ctfunsk- , 
DATED THIS 2 3 dav of CJ^A? ^ W U/feoOQ. 
a 
MARGRETS 
Attorney for1 
EtT TAYLOR 
endant 
-1-
Certificate of Service^ 
I hereby certify that on this day of _ 2000, I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE to Attorney for Plaintiff, as follows: 
a GENE STRATE, Carbon County Attorney, Courthouse] 
n A 
Price, Utah 84501. 
c*-^ 
L 
-2-
TabB 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, PRICE DIVISION 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
ALAN KAY JUSTESEN, 
D e f e n d a n t . 
D a t e : 
P l a c e : 
ANN M. LOVE 
CSRNO. 139 
: TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING 
: ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
: Case No. 001700199 FS 
: Judge Bryce Bryner 
November 21 , 2000 
Carbon County Courthouse 
149 East 100 South 
P r i c e , Utah 
ORIGINAL 
INDEPENDENT REPORTING 
& VIDEOGRAPHY1 
1220 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)538-2333 
Fax (801)538-2334 
k* 1 ? IT 1 
1 
One-Source Court Reporting j 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
For the Plaintiff: Gene E. Strate 
Carbon County Attorney 
120 East Main Street 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone: (435) 636-3240 
For the Defendant: Margret S. Taylor 
Attorney at Law 
20 South Main Street 
Helper, Utah 84526 
Telephone: (435) 472-5513 
I N D E X 
Witness 
CARL THOMAS STEFANOFF 
Direct Examination by Mr. Strate 
Cross-Examination by Ms. Taylor 
1 November 21 , 2000 9:00 a.m. 
2 P R O C E E D I N G S 
3 THE COURT: So we'll next call case No, 199, State 
4 of Utah vs. Alan Kay Justesen. The record may show that 
5 Mr. Justesen is personally present, together with his 
6 counsel, Ms. Margret Taylor. The State is present through 
7 the County Attorney, Mr. Gene Strate. 
8 Preliminary hearing has been held in this matter 
9 and the defendant was bound over. Subsequent to that, 
10 Ms. Margret Taylor filed a notice of appearance of counsel 
11 and has also now filed a motion to suppress evidence. This 
12 matter is before the Court this morning for an evidentiary 
13 hearing on the motion to suppress. Is the State ready? 
14 MR. STRATE: Yes, Your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: And is the defendant ready? 
16 MR. JUSTESEN: Yeah. 
17 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Strate, you may 
18 proceed. 
19 MR. STRATE: Thanks, Your Honor. I'd call Officer 
20 Stefanoff, please. 
21 THE COURT: Mr. Stefanoff, come forward, please. 
22 Raise your right hand and be sworn. 
23 (The witness is sworn.) 
24 THE COURT: Have a chair, please. 
25 
1 CARL THOMAS STEFANOFF, 
2 being first duly sworn, was examined and testified 
3 as follows: 
4 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
5 BY MR. STRATE: 
6 Q Good morning, Officer. 
7 A Good morning. 
8 Q Could we have your name and where you live, please? 
9 A Carl Thomas Stefanoff. Price, Utah. 
10 Q Where are you employed? 
11 A For the Carbon County Sheriff's Office. 
12 Q How long have you been a peace officer? 
13 A For seven years. 
14 Q What is your position with the sheriff's office? 
15 A Patrol sergeant. 
16 Q Sergeant, allow me to direct your attention to June 
17 the 17th of the year 2000, it looks like about 15 minutes 
18 before 1:00 a.m. on that date. Were you on duty for the 
19 sheriff's office? 
20 A I was. 
21 Q Where were you at that time? 
22 A I was patrolling the Airport Road. 
23 Q Is that in Carbon County? 
24 A It is. 
25 Q Was this just standard, routine patrol you were 
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doing? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yes. 
Did you have occasion to be alerted to a vehicle? 
I did. 
What was it that caught your eye? 
I observed a vehicle on the right side of the road 
facing eastbound, just parked, no lights on. 
Q 
A 
airport 
Q 
road? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Where was that vehicle in relation to the airport? 
It was approximately a mile northeast of the 
in an area known as the maze. 
Okay. Was the vehicle just on the side of the main 
Yes, just off the—yeah. 
Any illumination in that area? 
No. 
Any streetlights, anything of that— 
No. 
As we go along here, Sergeant, it might be helpful 
if we had a diagram. Could you just kind of show us the 
layout of the road and where this vehicle was? 
A Yes. The vehicle—the vehicle was parked there, 
and then I came up and pulled up behind the vehicle here. 
Q 
nose of 
A 
On the van, would you indicate which way is the 
the van? 
(Witness complies.) 
5 
1 Q And do I understand it's parked on the proper side 
2 of the road, that if it pulled out it would be in the proper 
3 travel lane? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q What's on the sides of the road in that area, just 
6 ] rough terrain? 
7 A There was—there's a gravel pit. There was a lot 
8 of gravel, big pile of gravel on—it's all over the ground 
9 and there was a big pile about right in here. 
10 Q Anything in front of the van obstructing it from 
11 entering the roadway? 
12 A No. 
13 Q How far off the road was the van? 
14 A Just several feet. 
15 Q What type of car were you in? 
16 A Ford Explorer. 
17 Q Why don't you take your chair again. Thank you. 
18 A Uh-huh. 
19 Q You indicated there that this was a van? 
20 A Correct. 
21 Q Can you describe what it looked like and— 
22 A It was a white Ford minivan. 
23 Q How new a model, do you recall? 
24 A I don't. It was a '91. '91. 
25 Q '91? 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Uh-huh. 
Does it have windows on the back of the van? 
It does. 
When you pulled up behind it, any lights on at all 
on the van? 
A 
Q 
A 
None. No. 
Why did you go to the van? 
I pulled behind the van to check the welfare of any 
people that may be in there, to see if it was broken down, to 
see if somebody needed assistance in getting their car 
repaired 
get some 
vehicle, 
or if they needed a ride back or maybe a phone to 
assistance to help them with their broken-down 
or if it was abandoned and they just left it there. 
Just wanted to make sure it was okay. 
Q 
headlight 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
point? 
A 
Q 
A 
lights on 
I assume this early in the morning you had your 
s on when you pulled behind the van? 
I did. 
Did you leave those on? 
I did. 
Do you recall if you had your brights on at that 
I didn't. 
Did not? 
No. And I used my takedown lights—two white 
i the top of my vehicle to illuminate the area. 
7 
1 Q Are the takedown lights part of the bar on the 
2 vehicle? 
3 A They are. Just looks like two spotlights up there. 
4 Q Are they in the center of the bar? 
5 A They are. 
6 Q What was your—why did you turn those on? 
7 A For officer safety reasons. Again, I don't know 
8 what's going on at the time. Just to illuminate the area, 
9 give me some more safety. 
10 Q Did you exit your vehicle at that time? 
11 A I did. 
12 Q And what did you do? 
13 A As I exited and got out of my vehicle, I observed 
14 the brake lights come on on the vehicle. 
15 Q Did they stay on? 
16 A No, they just came on for a minute and as I walked 
17 up I don't know if they stayed on or not. 
18 Q Did you approach the driver's side? 
19 A I did. 
20 Q What happened once you got there? 
21 A I spoke with the driver. 
22 Q How was that done? Window rolled down or... 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Okay. 
25 A Window was rolled down. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Who was the driver? 
Alan Justesen. 
He's the gentleman here in court? 
Affirmative. 
When you approached the car, any indications of 
alcohol usage there? 
name 
sear 
beve 
had 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
was 
Q 
A 
ched 
Q 
rage 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Yeah, I could smell alcohol. 
Did you ask Mr. Justesen for identification? 
I did. 
Did he provide any to you? 
No. He stated he didn't have any and told me his 
Steve Templeton—or Steve Temple. 
Was it sometime later that you got his actual ID? 
Yeah. After he was arrested, the vehicle was 
incident to arrest and his wallet was found. 
Now, you mentioned that you smelled an alcohol 
as you spoke with him; is that correct? 
Correct. 
How strong was that smell? 
Very distinctive. 
What did you do then? 
I asked him if he'd been drinking. He told me he'd 
a few. 
Q 
A 
Did you notice where the keys were? 
I did. They were in the ignition. 
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Q 
A 
What happened then? 
Mr. Justesen stepped out of the vehicle for several 
field sobriety tests. 
Q 
correct? 
A 
wanted me 
our compl 
further. 
And you subsequently arrested him for DUI; is that 
Correct. 
MR. STRATE: I assume that's as far as counsel 
to go on the suppression issue, Your Honor. 
MS. TAYLOR: I think that is the essence of our—of 
aint here. 
THE COURT: Cross-examine? 
MS. TAYLOR: I don't think we need to go any 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MS. TAYLOR: 
Q 
Sheriff's 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
after—if 
it before 
How long have you been with the Carbon County 
Office? 
Seven years. 
And your title? 
Sergeant. 
Were you alone? 
I was. 
Tell me—this is on Airport Road. Is it before or 
you were leaving from here to go to the airport, is 
you get to the airport or past the airport? 
10 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Past the airport. 
How far? 
Approximately a mile. 
A mile? 
Uh-huh. 
And if you kept going on that road, where would you 
get? To the mine? 
A 
Q 
Yeah, to the mine. 
That's the road that goes past the airport and then 
up to Deadman Canyon, at the mine? 
A 
Q 
earlier 
A 
Q 
you saw 
1:00 in 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Had you been on this road earlier that day or 
that evening? 
I don't recall. 
Had you—prior to the time that you told us that 
this vehicle, and I believe it was short—just before 
the morning; is that right? 
Zero 41 hours, yes. 
Okay. And you had not seen this vehicle on that 
same night prior to this; is that right? 
A 
Q 
night? 
A 
Correct. 
Had you been in this area prior to this the same 
I don't recall. If it was, it would have been 
hours before. 
11 
1 Q But you had not seen the vehicle parked at that 
2 location prior to this encounter? 
3 A No. 
4 Q What color is this vehicle? 
5 A White. 
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Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Excuse me? 
White. 
White? And you said it's a minivan? 
Uh-huh. 
A 1991? 
Yes. 
Had you seen this vehicle ever before? 
No. 
Were you familiar with the vehicle at all? 
No. 
Were you familiar with Mr. Justesen prior to the 
time that you had this encounter with him? 
A 
Q 
an area 
A 
Q 
A 
it the 
Q 
No. 
And I believe you told Mr. Strate that this was in 
known as the maze. 
Correct. 
Could you explain why it's called the maze? 
Juvenile parties are held there and they've named 
maze. 
The police officers named it the maze? 
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A 
Q 
No. It's been that name for 20 years. 
And you also said that there's a gravel pit in the 
neighborhood. Is it off to the side of the road? 
A 
Q 
no other 
Yes. There was a pile of gravel. 
And I believe I understood you to say that there's 
lighting of any kind in this area. There aren't any 
streetlights or anything like that? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Correct. 
Was there any other traffic? 
No. 
Did you see any other vehicles on Airport Road that 
same night? 
A 
Q 
the east, 
A 
Q 
road, it 
directior 
A 
Q 
or no. 
Q 
No. I may have. I don't recall before or after. 
Okay. And the vehicle you said was pointing toward 
you said? 
Northeast. 
Northeast? So if the vehicle had pulled off the 
would have kept going—and kept going the same 
L, it would have gone on up toward where the mine is? 
Uh-huh. 
Okay. 
THE COURT: Mr. Stefanoff, you need to answer yes 
THE WITNESS: Oh, yes. 
(By Ms. Taylor) And when you were driving up the 
13 
1 road in your Ford Explorer, did you just have your regular 
2 headlights on at that time? 
3 A They could have been my brights if there was no 
4 other traffic. I don't recall. 
5 Q But at that—at that time you didn't have any of 
6 your other lights that are on the bar? 
7 A No, 
8 Q You didn't have any of those on, you were just 
9 driving the Ford Explorer up the road with its regular lights 
10 on? 
11 A Yes. 
12 Q And when you saw this vehicle, did you immediately 
13 pull in behind it? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q And how far behind the vehicle was your vehicle 
16 parked? 
17 A Approximately six to eight feet. 
18 Q Is that about what you—about as far back as you 
19 park when you make a normal traffic stop? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q And you indicated at that time that you didn't see 
22 any lights in the van? 
23 A Correct. 
24 Q Like the dome light or nothing like that was on? 
25 A No. 
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Q 
said that 
A 
Q 
A 
on the li 
Q 
light bai 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
(No 
Q 
And when you put your vehicle there, I believe you 
. you turned your takedown 1 
Yes. 
What are takedown lights? 
Two white spotlights that 
.ght bar. 
On the light bar? Are the 
-, as well? 
Yes. 
What are the other lights 
There's red and blue light 
Those are the ones that go 
audible response.) 
ights on; is that right? 
are on top of my vehicle, 
re other lights on the 
on the light bar? 
s, rotating lights. 
round and round? 
Okay. And so you're six to eight feet behind the 
vehicle and you immediately turn—as 
vehicle— 
A 
Q 
lights? 
A 
-your vehicle and then turn 
Yes. 
Can you tell the Court why 
I can't. That's the name 
gave them, I guess. I don't know. 
Q 
soon—did you park the 
on the takedown lights? 
they're called takedown 
the light bar company 
When you make a normal traffic stop like you were 
going down the road and you're picki 
speeding or something like that and 
your takedown lights, do you not? 
nq{ somebody up for 
it's night, you put on 
15 
1 A After I'm stopped, yes. 
2 Q So it's typical of a traffic stop for you to turn 
3 on those takedown lights? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And in a normal situation, if you're going to—if 
6 you're following someone down the road and you see an 
7 offense, do you put your revolving lights on first? 
8 A Yes, the red and blues. 
9 Q And that's to get the vehicle to stop; right? 
10 A Correct. 
11 Q To notify the vehicle to stop? 
12 A Correct. 
13 Q But when you pull up behind the vehicle, that's 
14 when you take down—you put on the takedown lights? 
15 A Yes, if they're needed. 
16 Q And I presume that that lightens the area 
17 considerably. 
18 A Yes, it lights up the vehicle ahead of me. 
19 Q When you pulled up behind the van, could—were you 
20 aware that there was anyone inside the van? 
21 A I wasn't. 
22 Q Were you able to see through the windows that there 
23 were people in there? 
24 A No. 
25 Q You indicated that you saw some brake lights come 
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on, I presume in the back, on the back of the van. 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
vehicle? 
A 
if I was 
Yes. 
And were you still in your vehicle at that time? 
No, I was just getting out of my vehicle. 
You were just opening the door to get out of the 
I don't recall if I had—if I was just outside or 
in the process—I was in the process of getting out 
and shutting the door. 
Q 
A 
Q 
So but you did see the brake lights come on? 
Yes. 
Which would indicate to you that there was—the 
likelihood that there was a person inside this van? 
A 
Q 
prior to 
A 
Q 
side as 1 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
But you had already had your takedown lights on 
the time you saw this; is that right? 
Correct. 
And you approached the van through the—on the same 
the driver? 
Yes. 
And the driver then would have been—the driver, as 
opposed to the passenger side of the van was then on the 
road—on the side that you approached; is that right? Is 
that a confusing question? 
A Yeah, Ifm confused. 
17 
1 Q When the van is on the side of the road then you 
2 approach from the driver's side; right? 
3 A Yes, 
4 Q Which is also the road side? 
5 A It's on the side of the road, yes. 
6 Q How far off the side of the road was the van? 
7 A Several feet. 
8 Q How many by "several"? Two? Eight? 
9 A Two to three. 
10 Q Two or three feet? Was the van parked illegally? 
11 A No. 
12 Q Did you have some suspicion that there was 
13 something going on here? 
14 A No. 
15 Q Did you have any reason to suspect that anyone in 
16 this van had committed a crime? 
17 A No. 
18 Q Did you have any reason to suspect that anyone in 
19 this van was about to commit a crime? 
20 A No. 
21 Q Did you have any reasonable suspicion at all with 
22 regard to anything when you approached this van? 
23 A No. 
24 Q Did you have any other information with regard to 
25 this van that would call your attention to it in terms of the 
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possibil. 
A 
Q 
that you 
to check 
A 
Q 
indicatii 
ity of committing a crime? 
No. 
You indicated earlier that you were going to stop— 
r purpose in making this stop was a number of things, 
on the welfare of someone who was inside the van? 
That was possibly inside, uh-huh. 
Did you have any indication from anywhere or anyone 
ig that there was someone in this van that needed 
some care or concern or their welfare checked on? 
A 
Q 
someone 1 
A 
Q 
you were 
No, that's why I stopped to check. 
You had no previous information that there was 
:here that needed your assistance? 
No. 
You indicated also that one of your reasons—that 
wondering if this van had broken down. Did you have 
any indication when you saw the van that it was broken down? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
problem? 
A 
Q 
You mean from when I stopped or— 
Yeah. Could you tell by looking at the van— 
No, I did not know if it was broken. 
—that it was broken down? 
No. 
Or that there was some sort of a mechanical 
No. 
No one had given you any information to that 
19 
1 effect? 
2 A No. 
3 Q And you had—did you see a flat tire? Did you see 
4 a bent fender? 
5 A Not from where I was at, no. 
6 Q You didn't see anything that would give you an 
7 indication with regard to whether the van was broken down? 
8 A No. 
9 Q When you came up behind the van, was there any 
10 signal or any indication—had someone put like a red thing 
11 out on the antenna or had—was there any indication that 
12 these people needed assistance? 
13 A No. 
14 Q Was there any indication—did anyone get out of the 
15 van and flag you down saying, "I need a phone/' or, you know, 
16 "I have somebody who's sick" or— 
17 A No. 
18 Q None of the above? 
19 (No audible response.) 
20 Q When you were parked initially behind the van, you 
21 did see the brake light come on; right? 
22 A Correct. 
23 Q You also indicated that you were trying to 
24 determine whether or not the van was abandoned. Did that — 
25 A Correct. 
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Q --brake light indicate to you that the van was 
abandoned? 
A No. 
Q And you noticed that brake light prior to the time 
you approached the vehicle, did you not? 
A As I was getting out of my vehicle. 
Q After the takedown lights were already on? 
A Correct. 
Q Isn't it true, Officer, that the purpose of 
takedown lights is to indicate to the person who is in the 
vehicle in front of you that you're coming up there to visit 
with them or to talk to them about a problem? 
A No. 
Q Excuse me? 
A No. 
Q In other words—let me reask this question. 
When you turn those takedown lights on, what are 
you telling the occupant in the vehicle in front of you? 
MR. STRATE: Well, Your Honor, I have to object. I 
think that calls for a legal conclusion. 
MS. TAYLOR: I'm just trying to— 
MR. STRATE: The officer doesn't know what the 
people in the van think. He just said he turned them on to 
illuminate the area. 
THE COURT: Well, the question is: What are you 
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1 telling those people? So he's not ask—she's not asking what 
2 the perception of the officer is—what the perception of the 
3 people in the van is. But it is an objectionable question 
4 because you're assuming facts not in evidence. You're 
5 assuming that he's telling the people something. There's no 
6 evidence that he's telling the people anything by turning the 
7 lights on. 
8 MS. TAYLOR: That's my question. 
9 THE COURT: So you need to ask that question, then. 
10 That's not what you asked. 
11 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. That's my question. 
12 Q (By Ms. Taylor) When you turn those takedown 
13 lights on—the two spotlights that are on top of your Ford 
14 Explorer, when you take those two—when you put those two 
15 lights on, what are you attempt—what, if anything, are you 
16 attempting to tell the people in the vehicle that's in front 
17 of you? 
18 A Nothing. 
19 Q Nothing? 
20 A I'm not telling them anything. 
21 Q All right, let me ask you another question. 
22 Had—at the time that you pulled up behind this van 
23 and you put your takedown lights on, were you telling the 
24 operator of that vehicle in front of you, There's a cop 
25 behind you who needs to talk to you? 
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1 A No. 
2 Q Now, if when you parked—when you came up behind 
3 the van and put your takedown lights on, had this vehicle 
4 simply started its engine and driven off, what would you have 
5 done then? 
6 A I would have took it that the people were okay and 
7 the vehicle was fine and they were free to go, 
8 Q Isn't it also possible at that time that you would 
9 have followed the van and pulled it over and charged the 
10 driver with evading? 
11 A No. 
12 Q I'm curious with regard to the calling or the 
13 naming of these lights "takedown/' Isn't it a familiar 
14 police usage of the language with regard to when you're 
15 stopping a vehicle that you're going to take somebody down? 
16 A No. Every time that the lights are used, 
17 somebody's not taken down, so I don't think that— 
18 Q Didn't you tell me earlier that when you make a 
19 normal traffic stop that that's what you do when you pull up 
20 behind a vehicle? 
21 A It is, and I use it for lighting up anything, 
22 businesses to check their business. So I'm not taking 
23 anybody down there. 
24 Q What do you mean, "checking businesses"? 
25 A If I'm doing a security check on a business and I 
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1 need to light up the area, I will turn on my takedown lights 
2 to illuminate the area so I can see if there's anybody around 
3 there. So I'm not using it to take anybody down there, so 
4 it's not used all the time to take somebody down. 
5 Q Would it be fair to say, Officer, that this is a 
6 fairly isolated area? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q How many miles is it back to the Price Main Street 
9 from there? 
10 A Three to four. 
11 Q Three to four miles? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Does your department have a policy with regard to 
14 vehicles that are parked alongside of the road? 
15 A No. 
16 Q Are you fam—are you aware of any provision in the 
17 Utah Code that prohibits a vehicle from parking off the side 
18 of the road? 
19 A No. There are some parking violations— 
20 Q Are you claiming that this vehicle was violating 
21 some kind of a parking violation? 
22 A Nope. 
23 Q I believe at one point you slaid that you saw that 
24 the key was in the ignition. 
25 A Yes. 
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Q And you were standing on the driver's side—near 
the driver's side door? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
you call 
A 
Q 
Yes. 
Was the window open at that time? 
Yes. 
And can you tell me on which side of the—what do 
this that goes—that has the— 
Steering column. 
The steering—yeah. On which side of the steering 
column did the key—was the key in? 
A 
steering 
Q 
door— 
A 
Q 
the ignit 
From which direction are you looking at the 
column? 
Assuming that you're standing at the driver's 
Okay. 
—and the driver's door—and the window is open, is 
ion on the left side of the steering column or the 
right side of the steering column? 
A 
Q 
itself is 
key enter 
A 
Q 
It's on the right side. 
And what—isn't it true that the steering column 
in between where you were standing and where the 
ed the ignition? 
Yes. 
Can you tell me—describe the key. 
MR. STRATE: Your Honor, I'd—if I could intervene 
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1 here, and I guess this is an objection. I think we're just 
2 getting beyond the scope of the suppression issue, which is 
3 does the officer have a right to approach that driver and 
4 talk to him. I don't see where this would be relevant to 
5 today's proceedings. 
6 THE COURT: Sustained. 
7 MS. TAYLOR: Could I address that? 
8 THE COURT: I'll allow you to address it, yes. 
9 MS. TAYLOR: Only in the context that there is a 
10 Utah case from several—probably 20 or more years ago named 
11 State v. Bugger that has to do with whether or not there's— 
12 whether or not the keys are in the ignition when someone is 
13 sitting alongside the road. That's what I'm attempting to 
14 get to. 
15 THE COURT: But that's irrelevant to today's 
16 hearing. The question is: Was there a reasonable suspicion 
17 to approach the vehicle? So the objection is sustained. 
18 Q (By Ms. Taylor) Just one other question. You 
19 indicated that—do you—do you patrol this area fairly 
20 frequently? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Was this on a weekend? 
23 A Yes. 
24 Q Had you had any reports of any juveniles in the 
25 area? 
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A No. 
Q You indicated I believe in your testimony earlier 
that you often find juveniles out there at the maze having 
parties and that kind of thing? 
A No, we don't often find them. 
Q But you mentioned something to that effect, that 
occasionally— 
A The reason it's named the maze, yeah, that's why. 
Q And it was the kids who named the maze or the cops 
who named it the maze? 
A I guess the kids. I don't know who named it. Many 
years ago. 
Q But there have been juvenile parties in that area 
before? 
A Yes. 
Q Is that what you suspected of this van? 
A No. 
Q Do you work the graveyard shift fairly frequently? 
A No. 
Q Let me ask you this: When you—if you were driving 
around on patrol, you patrol the whole county, do you not? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you stop for every vehicle that you see 
alongside the road to see whether or not they are broken down 
or need assistance or the vehicle's abandoned? 
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^ _ _ 
1 A That would depend. 
2 Q On? 
3 A Location. If it's out in an isolated area where 
4 somebody could need a ride or need a phone or needs some 
5 assistance, yeah. If it's right in Price City along Main 
6 Street, no, I'm not going to stop. There's plenty of people 
7 around that can help them. If it's out on the highway, out 
8 on SR6 somewhere or up a canyon, yeah, I'm going to stop and 
9 see if they need help. 
10 Q And you're going to help them and stop and visit 
11 with them, even if there is no indication at all from anyone, 
12 including the occupants of the vehicle, that they don't need 
13 any help? 
14 A Yes. 
15 MS. TAYLOR: I think that's all I have, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Redirect? 
17 MR. STRATE: No redirect, Your Honor. 
18 THE COURT: You may step down. 
19 MR. STRATE: The State rests. 
20 THE COURT: The record may show that the State 
21 rests, 
22 MS. TAYLOR: We have no testimony, Your Honor. 
23 THE COURT: All right. The .record should also show 
24 then that the defendant elects not to present any witnesses 
25 at this time. I'll hear your argument. 
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1 MR. STRATE: Thanks, Your Honor. 
2 Your Honor, I think this is clearly a level one 
3 encounter between the officer and Mr. Justesen. The facts 
4 are that the officer's out on a remote road and sees a van on 
5 the side of the road. There's no illumination, none coming 
6 from the van. I think he said about a mile and a half beyond 
7 the airport. The officer hadn't been out on the road for 
8 hours. Any decent officer is going to stop and see if 
9 there's a problem. 
10 And that's what the officer did here. He pulled 
11 over. He said he had—he may have had his high beams on 
12 earlier going down the—it's 1:00 in the morning or 
13 (inaudible). He may have had his high beams on but when he 
14 came behind the car, he had his low beams on. He couldn't 
15 see into the back of the van, couldn't tell what was going on 
16 in there, if there was anybody in there at all. 
17 He didn't know whether he had an abandoned car, 
18 broken down car, people needing assistance or what the 
19 situation was. And he turned on, quote, the takedown lights, 
20 which sounds a little bit sinister but they're just 
21 spotlights. He said the officers don't name them takedown 
22 lights, the manufacturer apparently does. 
23 These are lights he uses anytime he needs 
24 illumination, whether he's doing a business check or vehicle 
25 check of this type. He turned those on just so he could see. 
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1 And you can imagine an officer approaching a situation like 
2 this where it's dark. And he could easily walk into a 
3 dangerous situation and get shot because he can't see what's 
4 going on. 
5 At any rate, he turns those lights on, he just 
6 gets—starts to get out of the car when he sees the brake 
7 lights come on on the vehicle and he just walks up to talk to 
8 these people. I think this is clearly just a level one 
9 encounter. An officer can talk to anybody, as long as he 
10 doesn't detain them. He's a citizen like anybody else, he 
11 can walk up and talk to people. 
12 There was no indication at all that he had detained 
13 Mr. Justesen. He didn't have his flashing red and blue 
14 lights on. The van's ahead of him I think he said six or 
15 eight feet. The van's just two or three feet off the road, 
16 can pull right back on the travel lane and pull away. And 
17 the officer's testimony—his uncontroverted testimony here 
18 today is that if the van had pulled away, he would have let 
19 him go. He just didn't know what—if there was anybody in 
20 there who needed help or whether the car was abandoned. 
21 (Inaudible) there's no obstruction to Mr. Justesen 
22 leaving. Any wise officer is going to illuminate the area 
23 when he goes to give assistance. If there had been somebody 
24 hurt there, for instance, he'd need the lights to assist 
25 those motorists. 
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1 I think the closest on point is State v. Struhs. 
2 It's a 1997 case from the Court of Appeals, and I assume 
3 Ms. Taylor will be talking about this. But a similar 
4 situation in that the officer used the, quote, takedown 
5 lights. But in that situation, Your Honor, a lady officer 
6 had seen a vehicle that looked suspicious to her. The 
7 vehicle had ended up backing against the barricade and 
8 turning its lights off. Apparently in a construction area, 
9 if I recall the facts correctly. 
10 The officer came along—she actually turned all of 
11 her lights off at one point and came up nose to nose with 
12 this vehicle and put on her bright headlights and hit her 
13 takedown lights and then got out and had an encounter with 
14 the subjects in the vehicle and finds drug (inaudible) and 
15 there's an arrest that takes place. 
16 Well, in that—in the Struhs case, that car 
17 couldn't move. The officer is obviously showing some sort of 
18 force of authority there by coming nose to nose, blasting all 
19 these lights on and locks the car in so it can't move. In 
20 this situation clearly that van could have just pulled away. 
21 There's nothing that prohibits that van moving away. 
22 In the Struhs case the Court cites State v. 
23 (inaudible) from 1989 and says, "An officer may approach a 
24 citizen at any time and pose questions so long as the citizen 
25 is not detained against his will/' That's a level one 
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1 encounter. 
2 Level two would be when the officer can articulate 
3 reasonable suspicion and then can detain or seize the party. 
4 So as a practical matter I think what happened here is we 
5 have a level one encounter. The officer was going to render 
6 assistance. Mr. Justesen rolled down the window, they talked 
7 and the officer immediately smelled an alcoholic beverage 
8 odor. He asked Mr. Justesen if he had been drinking. "I've 
9 had a few/' and wham, reasonable suspicion. 
10 But there was no traffic stop here and that van 
11 clearly could pull out on the road, was not blocked in in any 
12 way, as was the case with Struhs, and can easily be 
13 distinguished from that case. 
14 THE COURT: Thank you. Ms. Taylor? 
15 MS. TAYLOR: I too, Your Honor, would cite the case 
16 of State v. Struhs, which was—S-t-r-u-h-s—which was decided 
17 by the appellate court in June of 1997. It's a very similar 
18 case to the case at bar. 
19 Mr. Strate is right and the courts have, over a 
20 number of period of time, determined that there are three 
21 levels of possible stop. And I'm quoting from the case of 
22 State v. Johnson. "An officer may approach a citizen at any 
23 time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
24 detained against his will." 
25 The second level, "An officer may seize a person if 
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1 the person has an articulable suspicion"—"if the officer has 
2 an articulable suspicion that the person has committed a 
3 crime or is about to commit a crime." 
4 And the third is, "An officer may arrest a suspect 
5 if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense has 
6 been committed or is being committed/' 
7 My take on what Mr. Strate has told us with regard 
8 to this van being parked where it is, and if we were to 
9 assume and adopt his position, that it would then become 
10 legal at any point for a police officer to come up behind a 
11 vehicle that's parked alongside the road, put the takedown 
12 lights on and approach the vehicle and find whatever he finds 
13 when he gets there, whether legal or illegal. 
14 I think that position is untenuous. There is no 
15 law against parking on the side of the road. There's no 
16 traffic violation about stopping alongside of the road, so 
17 long as you're off the road. And I would quote to the Court 
18 that that section—there's an entire section in the 41 
19 section about stopping, standing and parking. 
20 There's no law against it, there's no prohibition. 
21 The prohibition is if your car stops in the middle of the 
22 road, get it off to the side of the road so that you can 
23 stop—so that you're not obstructing traffic. But there's no 
24 reference to there being anything wrong with parking 
25 alongside of the road. 
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1 Now, if we adopt what Mr. Strate has told us here, 
2 any person at any time who pulls off to the side of the road 
3 for any reason, then that person, by being on the side of the 
4 road, can be seized, if you will, by an officer in a vehicle 
5 that comes up, whether behind it or in front of it or 
6 whatever. But once those takedown lights go on, that's a 
7 message to the people in the vehicle—that's a message to the 
8 people in that vehicle, There's a cop behind you, this cop 
9 wants to talk to you. 
10 The question in the Struhs case is whether or not— 
11 the facts are dissimilar only in one respect, Your Honor. In 
12 this case, the vehicle was parked off the side of the road in 
13 an isolated area. In the Struhs case, the vehicle was parked 
14 in an isolated area, the only difference being that the 
15 officer in the Struhs case—well, the driver in the Struhs 
16 case had not just pulled off the side of the road but had 
17 backed up to where the nose of his vehicle was out. 
18 And so in the Struhs case what happens is the 
19 officer comes and puts the—puts her vehicle right in front 
20 of his vehicle. But could not have put it behind the vehicle 
21 because the Struhs vehicle was parked—the rear end of it was 
22 up against some sort of a fence or something. That's the 
23 only difference. The only difference between this case and 
24 the Struhs case. 
25 The Court in the Struhs case—and if I might just 
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1 read a short paragraph here. And this is one of the earlier 
2 notes that—in the—rather than from the case itself, this is 
3 a note from the case. "The police officer's encounter with 
4 the suspect who was parked in a truck near a closed road in 
5 an isolated construction area at night constituted seizure 
6 requiring officers to have reasonable suspicion that the 
7 suspect had committed or was about to commit a crime. The 
8 officer and the partner drove down the road with their lights 
9 off, stopped one car length away from the vehicle nose to 
10 nose"—which I just said that was the difference—"and turned 
11 the vehicle's high-beam headlights and white takedowns down" 
12 —"and turned on the white takedown light." 
13 And the Struhs case particularly says that the fact 
14 that the takedown lights were put on is an essential part of 
15 the Struhs case. In other words, once those takedown lights 
16 go on, that is an indication that that person in that other 
17 vehicle is not free to leave. 
18 And that's the determination that this Court has to 
19 make, that in view of all the circumstances surrounding the 
20 incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was 
21 not free to leave. And I would submit to the Court that any 
22 person in a situation of Mr. Justesen in this situation, when 
23 a cop pulls up behind him, he obviously knows it's a cop, and 
24 the cop puts the takedown lights on—that's why they're 
25 called takedown lights, is because that—this—this—the fact 
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1 of him pulling in behind for no reason, no reason—reasons 
2 of, Do you need some help, or is the vehicle abandoned or 
3 whatever are not reasons to stop somebody on the side of the 
4 road. If somebody's having a problem, they put out a signal 
5 to that effect. They even have little cards that you can put 
6 in the back window. On the back of your sunscreen—sun thing 
7 that goes in your front window there's a—on the back it says 
8 "Call police, I need help/' 
9 If this vehicle or the people in the vehicle are 
10 for some reason asking for assistance, that's different. But 
11 if a vehicle is simply parked on the side of the road, and if 
12 a person for instance is simply sleeping in the back seat or 
13 for whatever reason, then police officers should not be at 
14 liberty to come up behind or in front of any vehicle and say, 
15 I'm here to see if you're abandoned or to see if you need a 
16 telephone or to see if you need some assistance or to see if 
17 somebody's sick or to see if—you know, whatever. 
18 It's an excuse. That's all it is, is an excuse. 
19 And if in fact—well, the—let me read from a—"Stopping and 
20 detaining a veh"—"stopping an automobile and detaining the 
21 occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the 
22 Fourteenth"—"of the Fourth Amendment, even though the 
23 purpose of the stop is limited and the; resulting detention is 
24 brief." And whether or not it's a seizure has to do with 
25 whether or not the person had reason to believe that he was 
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1 not free to leave. 
2 The takedown lights are used for the purpose of 
3 effectuating a stop. That's the reason that we put these 
4 lights on. The fact that he puts these lights on as opposed 
5 to just the headlights, for his safety I don't know that it 
6 makes a whole lot of difference. Because if he has his 
7 J lights on and he's walking up to the side of a vehicle, 
8 there's no indication that he should be worried about officer 
9 safety. There's nothing here to indicate that he should be 
10 worried about officer safety. 
11 If all he's going to do is stop and chat with these 
12 folks, he could have just left his lights on and walked up 
13 and said, "Do you need some help?" That's not what he said. 
14 The first thing he says is, "Have you been drinking?" That 
15 was the purpose of the stop. 
16 The difference, and particularly in the Struhs 
17 case, these takedown lights are part of the seizure because 
18 they're made to—the purpose of these takedown lights, the 
19 way they are, giant spotlights on the top bar, is not only to 
20 light the area but to indicate to whoever is in that vehicle 
21 in front of you or on the side of you or wherever the vehicle 
22 is—wherever those lights are pointed, the purpose of that 
23 is, You sit still till I get there. And that, under the 
24 Constitution, is in fact a seizure. 
25 Once this person has reason to believe that he 
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1 better not drive off or he better not walk off or he better 
2 not open the window or whatever, then he is in a position of 
3 not being—not being allowed to go on his way. And the 
4 Fourth Amendment guarantees the right of the people to be 
5 secure in their persons, houses and papers and against 
6 unreasonable searches and seizures. 
7 In this case, this officer made a seizure by his— 
8 by the way he went about it when he pulled up behind this 
9 van. Had he simply walked— parked—even if he had parked on 
10 the other side and walked across the road—a level one is in 
11 fact a—basically, it's like a—for instance, I'm walking 
12 down the street from my office to get a sandwich at the 
13 eatery and on the way I run into the Helper Chief of Police 
14 and we stop and say, "How are you?" And he asks me some 
15 questions and I ask him and we talk about the light parade or 
16 whatever. This is simple conversation between two people, 
17 one of whom happens to be a police officer. Because I 
18 happened to meet the Chief of Police of Helper City on the 
19 street and say, "Hi, how are you, how's you mom," he says, 
20 "Hi, how are you, how are your dogs/' that's not a seizure, 
21 it's a conversation. It's the same kind of conversation that 
22 any police officer can have with any citizen whenever. 
23 But if at that time this officer starts making it 
24 into something else, "We have a citation for you and we're"— 
25 you know, "We're going to take you to jail and you stay here 
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1 and wait"—and if that same thing had happened because 
2 someone was parked somewhere and comes up behind you, when 
3 they put that show of force—what those takedown lights is is 
4 a show of force in and of itself. It's a show of force 
5 j saying to this person, You may not leave. 
6 And I would—especially—the thing that concerns me 
7 is not only this case but giving this officer permission to 
8 do it again to anybody who happens to be parked on the side 
9 of the road, that it's okay to put your takedown lights on, 
10 to walk up, to tell them to—you know, "What's your name? 
11 Roll down the window. Have you been drinking?" It sounds 
12 like a seizure to me. If it looks like a seizure and it 
13 sounds like a seizure and it quacks like a seizure, it 
14 certainly looks like a seizure. 
15 And part of that seizure is directly related to 
16 those takedown lights. And the Court in Struhs put some 
17 emphasis on that, because this person was not free to leave 
18 when those lights came on. He may, as an afterthought, now 
19 come into this courtroom and say—after he's read the case, 
20 after he's discussed it with the prosecutor, may come in and 
21 say, "Oh, no, he could have just driven off." 
22 I would submit to the Court that if Mr. Justesen 
23 had simply turned on the key and driven off, he would have 
24 had those red and blue ones on and he would have been 
25 charging him with evading. And that's the difference. 
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1 We think that the officer in this case—in any 
2 similar case to this, any similar case to this, the Fourth 
3 Amendment requires that police officers stay out of other 
4 people's business. He has no reasonable suspicion. He can 
5 articulate nothing. He had never seen that van before. He 
6 had—didn't know how long it had been parked there. Didn't 
7 know whether it needed assistance. Didn't know whether 
8 somebody needed any welfare. 
9 What he was going up to that van for is because it 
10 was in an area where they have juvenile parties and it's the 
11 maze and there may be some juveniles in there and we're going 
12 to go see if they need help because they have a sliver in the 
13 finger. We're going to go see if they need help—they need 
14 us to help him get to the jail. That's what this was about. 
15 This isolated area has a reputation and he knows 
16 it, I know it, now the Court knows it. And because of that 
17 fact, because of what has happened in that area before, all 
18 the more reason—all the more reason that at any point in 
19 time a vehicle should be free to park off the side of the 
20 road. For whatever reason, as long as it's not an illegal 
21 reason, then there's no reason for a cop to stop. 
22 If somebody needs some help they put a little red 
23 flag out or they put a sign out or they put something in the 
24 window or they wave or they stand outside and wave or they 
25 call somebody on their cell phone or whatever they do. They 
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1 give you some indication that I need some assistance. But to 
2 use the goodness of my heart, I'm just coming along to see 
3 how you're doing and whether or not maybe somebody's throwing 
4 up or sick or something, that doesn't work. I would ask this 
5 Court, don't buy that. It's not true, 
6 These officers are trained as police officers 24 
7 seven 365. And that's what they have on their minds. 
8 They're looking for somebody who's committed a crime. They 
9 were hoping at least by this encounter to find someone who 
10 had committed a crime. 
11 And the seizure took place when those takedown 
12 lights went on. And without articu—without specific and 
13 articulated reasons to suspect—reasons to suspect, and he 
14 doesn't have a single one—he doesn't have a single reason 
15 that takes us to the reasonable suspicion that he needed in 
16 order to go up to that van. 
17 We would ask the Court to find that this is in fact 
18 a seizure. I would also suggest to the Court I would be more 
19 than happy to, if the Court would give me some time, to do a 
20 memorandum on this issue. But I think with the Struhs case, 
21 and as recent as it is from the appellate court in Utah, and 
22 the facts being so similar, so similar to those in this case, 
23 that the Struhs case, in my opinion, is binding. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you. Mr. Strate, do you wish to 
25 respond? 
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1 MR. STRATE: Just very briefly, Your Honor. 
2 As I mentioned before, Struhs says an officer may 
3 approach a citizen at any time and pose questions, so long as 
4 the citizen is not detained against his will. Ifm concerned 
5 if we adopt the defendant's approach here, Your Honor, what 
6 that really means is an officer may approach a citizen at any 
7 time as long as the officer can't see. I mean, this 
8 particular situation, the only reason the officer had these 
9 spotlights on is so he can illuminate the area. 
10 He doesn't know that van. There are no criminal 
11 violations. He said he had no reasonable suspicion to be 
12 stopping anybody. He just went to see what the problem was 
13 with that van and certainly should be able to see what he's 
14 doing. 
15 In Struhs the Court said, "Defendant is correct 
16 that Smith cites with approval cases which have held that if 
17 an officer blocks a defendant's vehicle, a seizure has 
18 occurred. Defendant claims that the officer's action of 
19 parking nose to nose about one car length away when his car 
20 was backed up against the barricade essentially blocked 
21 defendant in so he was unable to move. While defendant was 
22 not completely blocked in, the officer's positioning of her 
23 vehicle was certainly a (inaudible) ini favor of binding under 
24 a totality of the circumstances, the defendant was seized. 
25 Equally important to our analysis is the officer's stealthy 
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1 approach to defendant and her sudden activation of her 
2 headlights and white takedowns/' A course that we don't have 
3 in this case. 
4 "In State v. Davis, a 1991 case, this Court 
5 determined that no seizure occurred when an officer drove up 
6 and merely stopped behind the parked car on the side of the 
7 road/7 I'd be happy to submit a copy of the Struhs case to 
8 the Court. I frankly don't think we need briefs on this 
9 matter, since this seems to be the case the Court's most 
10 likely to look at. I've got this marked up a little bit, but 
11 I can get a clean copy to the Court. 
12 I maintain my position, I think this is just level 
13 one encounter. 
14 THE COURT: Ms. Taylor, do you have the citation 
15 for the Johnson case that you cited? 
16 MS. TAYLOR: Yes. 805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991). This 
17 is a Utah Supreme Court case that went up on certiorari from 
18 the appellate court. 
19 THE COURT: All right. And then the citation on 
20 the Struhs case? 
21 MS. TAYLOR: Citation on Struhs is 940 P.2d 1225 
22 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
23 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
24 MS. TAYLOR: Could I—one response to Mr. Strate? 
25 THE COURT: No, I'm going to— 
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1 MS, TAYLOR: I think we— 
2 THE COURT: You've given your position— 
3 MS. TAYLOR: —(inaudible). 
4 THE COURT: —and I know his position. 
5 MS. TAYLOR: Okay. 
6 THE COURT: I might just state at this point that I 
7 am persuaded that when the officer pulled off the road, he 
8 intended a level one stop. The legal question presented, 
9 however, it appears, is once the takedown lights were 
10 activated, does that constitute the initiation of a level two 
11 stop? That seems to be the legal question that you're 
12 presenting the Court with. And— 
13 MS. TAYLOR: And Struhs cites several other cases, 
14 Your Honor, including the Davis case that Mr. Strate cited. 
15 And also a case from 1989, State v. Smith. 
16 THE COURT: All right. Well, I'm going to read 
17 that Struhs case. And, of course, the other cases that are 
18 alluded to in that, I will also read. So I'm going to take 
19 this matter under advisement. I don't need any memorandum. 
20 I'm confident that the Struhs case, together with the cases 
21 cited therein, will give the Court what it needs in order to 
22 issue a proper decision. 
23 MS. TAYLOR: In writing? 
24 THE COURT: Yes. The Court will issue a written 
25 decision on this. So I think you and— 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND F0R 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
hLtU 
JAN 
SEVENTH DISTRICT COUR1-
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
ALAN KAY JUSTESEN, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
Criminal No. 001700199 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence came on regularly for an evidentiary hearing 
on November 21, 2000. The court heard the sworn testimony of the witnesses and the arguments 
of counsel, took the matter under advisement, and now issues this ruling. 
I. Facts 
Sergeant Tom Stefanoff of the Carbon County Sheriffs Department was patrolling Airport 
Road about one mile northeast of the airport at 12:45 a.m. on June 17, 2000, when he noticed a 
white 1991 Ford minivan parked several feet off the paved road. Because the area is somewhat 
isolated, Stefanoff pulled in and stopped 6'-8* behind the vehicle. Seeing no lights or anyone in 
the van, he activated the white "take-down" lights in the light bar on the top of his patrol vehicle, 
exited his vehicle, and observed the brake lights of the van turn on. He did not activate his red 
and blue flashing lights. He approached the driver's window and observed the defendant sitting 
in the van with the keys in the ignition, although the engine was not running. Stefanoff asked the 
defendant for some I.D. and the defendant responded that his name was Steve Templeton but that 
he had no I.D. Stefanoff smelled a distinctive odor of an alcoholicbeverage emanating from the 
defendant's person, and the defendant stated that he had had a few drinks. 
i a 
Stefanoff testified that at the time he approached the van he did not suspect that anyone had 
committed a crime, that he had no reasonable suspicion to believe anyone had committed a 
crime, and that the van was not parked illegally. He further testified that he stopped behind the 
van for the purpose of determining whether someone needed assistance or whether the van was 
abandoned. 
The defendant was arrested for Driving under the Influence of Alcohol, Driving on a Denied 
License, and Giving False Personal Information to a Police Officer, all misdemeanors. 
II. Analysis 
The defendant contends that the encounter with the officer began as a level one stop when 
Stefanoff thought the van might be abandoned or the occupant may need assistance, but that it 
quickly elevated to a level two stop when he activated his take-down lights. The defendant 
further claims that the level two encounter was not supported by reasonable suspicion and that 
the evidence obtained by talking with the defendant should be suppressed. 
The question presented is whether Stefanoff s act of activating the "take-down" lights 
constituted a seizure. A seizure occurs "only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding 
the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." United 
States v MendenhalL 446 U.S. 544, at 553, and 100 S.Ct. 1870 at 1877 (1980). The court must 
therefore turn its attention to whether a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances 
would have thought that he was free to leave. 
The court finds that the defendant had no physical obstruction in front of his vehicle that 
would have prevented him from leaving. Furthermore, the lights activated by the officer were 
not the familiar red and blue flashing lights, but were in the nature of two white spotlights on the 
top of the officer's vehicle which had the effect of illuminating the surrounding immediate area. 
Although there were no physical obstructions in front of the defendant's vehicle that would 
have prevented him from leaving, the take-down lights were extremely bright and were on the 
top of the vehicle, and given the time of night and the isolated location, the court finds that a 
reasonable person would think that the activation of the take-down lights meant that they were 
intended as a display of authority and that he was not free to leave. It is significant also that 
under Utah law, non-emergency vehicles would not be able to approach defendant and shine their 
lights on the defendant as the officer did in this case. See UCA 41-6-129d and 131. 
Because a reasonable person under the totality of the circumstances would have perceived 
that he was not free to leave, the court finds that the defendant was seized and that this was a 
level two stop that must be supported by an "articulable suspicion" that the defendant had 
committed or was about to commit a crime. However, StefanofF testified that he did not suspect 
that the defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. Consequently, he had no 
authority to "seize" the defendant by activating his take-down lights and engaging in 
conversation with the defendant at the van's window. Thus, the observations of the officer while 
at the defendants window and the conversation between him and the defendant are not 
admissible in evidence. The defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence is granted. 
DATED this day of January, 2001. 
B/we K. Bryner, Judge 
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Deseret News, Sunday, August 05, 2001 
Officer's death shocks Lehi 
These kind of things don't happen here,' resident says 
By Angie Welling with Gib Twyman, Sharon Haddock and Brady Snyder 
Deseret News staff writers 
LEHI — Word of the death of police officer Joseph D. Adams in the line of duty spread 
slowly through this small Utah County town Saturday. And when the news hit, it hit hard. 
"This'll be a hard time for Lehi," predicted Assistant 
Fire Chief Bret Hutchings, swiping gently at his 
tear-filled eyes. frYou think little Lehi, these things 
just don't happen." 
Flags throughout the community of 19,000 flew at 
half-staff Saturday as investigators continued to 
examine the Friday night gunfight that left Adams 
dead and another man critically injured. Details 
remain sketchy, for police are releasing little 
information. 
From Hutchings' family-owned appliance store just 
two blocks from the empty police station — Utah 
County deputy sheriffs patrolled the town Saturday to allow Lehi officers time to grieve in 
private — he spoke fondly about the 26-year-old man killed during what began as a routine 
traffic stop. 
"He's the kind of guy that gave everybody a fair shake," Hutchings said. "He did the police 
job so well. He was well-liked by everybody." 
Three of Adams' friends spent the afternoon cleaning the blood from the road where the 
officer died. 
"This is an honor to come here and do this for Joe. He was my best friend," said Doug 
Fannen as he and two others used bleach and scouring pads to remove blood stains from the 
pavement. 
Adams had served on Lehi's 26-member police force for three years. He leaves behind a wife, 
Cydney, and an 8-month-old son. 
"You feel he's got to be in a better place than here, but it's so sad for his young family," 
Hutchings said. "And that's where our hearts will be." 
httr»-//H<aod»-o+»-»cmrr, ~ ~ — / J - / :-"•./* 
Wayne Keith, left, Doug Fannen and 
Ford Fannen, friends of slam Lehi 
police officer Joseph D. Adams, scrub 
blood Saturday from the roadside 
where Adams was shot. 
Scott G. Winterton, Deseret News 
Family members at Adams' Orem home on Saturday declined to comment when contacted 
by the Deseret News. 
Lehi Police Chief Karl Zimmerman said Adams will be missed. 
"It's bad," Zimmerman said about the mood within his 
department. "Everybody's really hurting." 
According to police, Adams stopped a suspected drunken driver 
at 2100 N. 1200 West just before 11 p.m. Friday. Adams 
reportedly ticketed the man for DUI and asked him to step out 
of his vehicle. In the process of being handcuffed, the man was 
somehow able to free one hand, grab a small handgun and begin 
shooting, Utah County Sheriffs Sgt. Dennis Harris said. 
A wounded Adams was still able to shoot the assailant 
numerous times before the man got into his car and drove away 
with Adams' handcuffs dangling from one wrist. 
Police have identified the man as Arturo Javier Scott Welch, 23, 
Joseph D. Adams leaves 
behind a wife and son. 
Associated Press 
West Valley City. 
Adams was shot at least twice, once on the left side of his chest a mere fraction of an inch 
above his protective vest, and once in the leg. He was flown by medical helicopter to LDS 
Hospital, where he was pronounced dead at 12:13 a.m. Saturday. 
Shortly after the shooting, Salt Lake County sheriffs deputies arrested Welch at a gas station 
at 11400 S. State in Draper. A license plate check on the red Chevrolet Cavalier Welch drove 
some 15 miles from Lehi to Draper indicates the vehicle was not registered to Welch. Police 
would not release information about the owner of the vehicle. 
Welch was also airlifted to LDS Hospital, where he remained in critical condition Saturday 
night with multiple gunshot wounds to the abdomen, spokesman Jess Gomez said. 
A search of court records indicates Welch was cited 
in April with a class B misdemeanor DUI and four 
class C misdemeanors, including driving with an 
open container. He pleaded not guilty to those 
charges in July, and an Aug. 17 pretrial conference 
is scheduled in that case. 
In 1996, Welch also pleaded guilty to fleeing from a 
peace officer and possession of alcohol by a minor, 
both class B misdemeanors. A third misdemeanor 
count of vehicle burglary was dismissed. 
Friday night, a passenger exited Welch's vehicle 
sometime during the gunfight. The man, whom 
Jeremy Elswood places flowers near 
where fellow officer Joseph D. Adams 
was slain. 
Scott G. Winterton, Deseret News 
police have identified only as an "acquaintance" of Welch, dialed 911 on his cell phone and 
waited for police to arrive. 
Harris described the man, who was questioned and released Saturday morning, as "very 
forthcoming. I believe he's helped out the detectives quite a bit." 
Officers arrived almost immediately and began performing CPR on Adams within minutes, 
said Hutchings, who was among the emergency personnel called to the emotional scene. 
"There was a lot of crying going on here last night, from the chief on down," Hutchings said. 
"None of us wanted to leave the scene. We just kind of stood there in amazement." 
State Sen. John Valentine, R-Orem, said his community is feeling a deep sense of loss over 
the slain officer. So is the Utah County Sheriffs Search and Rescue Team, of which Valentine 
is a part. 
"Our unit is fairly somber right now. One of our lieutenants was among the first on the scene 
and administered CPR to Officer Adams, so it's hitting him especially hard," Valentine said. 
"We had a training exercise at Bridal Veil Falls (Saturday) morning, and it was extremely 
difficult for everyone to get going, thinking about another peace officer being shot." 
State and county counseling teams are coordinating 
efforts to assist officers, dispatchers and staff 
members in dealing with the shock. 
The entire town of Lehi is dazed, convenience store 
clerk Karla Glodowski said. The shooting dominated 
conversations inside the store all day Saturday, she 
said. 
Mourners embrace where Lehi police "y0u have to keep hearing about it before it sinks in 
officer Joseph D. Adams was shot and because it's still a small town," Glodowski said. 
killed Friday night. „ T h e s e j ^ o f t h i n g s d o n < t h a p p e n h e r e ; . 
Jason Olson, Deseret News ° r t 
Adams' death comes less than a month after similar tragedy rocked another small Utah 
town. 
Roosevelt Police Chief Cecil Gurr was shot and killed July 6 after responding to a domestic 
dispute in a convenience store parking lot. Lee Roy Wood, Vernal, is charged with capital 
murder and could face the death penalty. 
"I think the citizens of Utah should really take this as a warning. We're a state that's growing, 
and with that increase brings good people and bad people," Harris said. "This is a wake-up 
call to the citizens of Utah and to the police officers of Utah." 1 
Lehi City Councilman Johnny Barnes agreed and issued a call that 
Adams' death not be in vain. 
"I want it to be a wake-up call for people, a motivation to get on the ball, 
get involved, teach our kids, not just point fingers," Barnes said. "I think 
we can use this to uplift and help by getting involved in service." 
Valentine said anytime a police officer goes down it creates shock waves 
both for law-abiding citizens and the peace-keeping fraternity — 
especially with the recent spate of fatal shootings. 
"We are grieved at the loss of yet another officer in the line of duty," Valentine said. "Being a 
police officer is a very risky endeavor. Every time he or she goes out, they face this 
possibility. 
"And yet they do keep going out because they are professionals. Now we've lost one of our 
own out of our city, and it is hard to find the words to express how extremely upsetting it is 
to us all." 
An Arts in the Parks "Country Showcase" program scheduled for tonight has been dedicated 
to Adams and the sacrifice he made for the community. The event will start at 7 p.m. in 
Wines Park, 600 N. 100 East in Lehi. A trust fund for Adams' family has been established at 
the Lehi branch of the Bank of American Fork. Donations can be made by calling the bank at 
766-1000. 
E-mail: awelling@desnews.com 
© 2001 Deseret News Publishing Company 
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ADDENDUM 
Fourth Amendment, United States Constitution 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] The right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 
Article I, Section 14, Utah State Constitution 
[Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of Warrant]. The 
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause 
supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
GQW, 
FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
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• * * * * 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
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EDWIN LESLIE DAVISr 
Defendant. 
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Case No, 902005554 TC 
* * # 
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JFebruary,__1991, .the above-entitled matter came on for 
hearing before the Honorable James L- Shumate, Judge of the 
above-named Court, at the Washington County Courthouse, St, 
George, Utah, and that the following proceedings were had: 
APPEAPAFCES; 
For the State: 
For the Defendant: 
WADE A. FARRAWAY, 
Deputy Washington County 
Attorney 
J* MACARTHUR WRIGHT, ESQ, 
B Y R O N R A V <~U»I«I»«A ****** «» 
three months part-time experience as Cat 1 officer for 
Hurricane City prior to the seven months full-time. 
Q. And have you had POST training? 
A. I have, yes. 
Q. And could you explain what that training was? 
A. Basic training for 11 weeks, criminal law. 
Q. Okay. And were you so employed with your position 
with the Hurricane Police Force on December 16, 1990? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. And on that occasion did you come into contact 
with one, Edwin Leslie Davis? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. And is Mr. Davis present in the courtroom at this 
time? 
A. Yes, he is. 
Q. Could you identify him for the record, please? 
A. Yes. He's wearing a green shirt. 
THE COURT: He has identified the defendant, 
counsel. 
Q. (By Mr. Farraway) And how did your contact with 
Mr. Davis come about? 
A. Okay. I was parked stationary on SR-9, my 
headlights were off. I seen a vehicle approaching from my 
rear, looking through my rear-view mirror. I noticed the 
headlights were on bright and it was driving very slow and 
B Y R O N RAY CHUIST IANSCN. Jit. 
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then it made a turn and turned off of State Road 9 into 
LeGrande Spilsbury's — the drive going into LeGrande 
Spilsbury's place. 
Q. Just — could I have you diagram how this — 
A. You bet. 
Q. You might want to use a darker color than that 
orange. 
A. Okay, I was parked about right here facing this 
.direction, and I first noticed the vehicle starting to slow 
down right here and then it turned in, it came in 
approximately, oh, I'd have to look at my report to see 
exactly. Come in approximately 100 feet or so, and then the 
lights went off. I was kinda concerned that early in the 
morning. I didn't know exactly what — if there was a 
problem. 
Q. What time was this? 
A. The time I pulled in was at 04:45, 04:44 was the 
first time I had noticed the car, about a minute we're 
talkin', from the time I seen it to the time I pulled right 
in, I wasn't very far away. I then turned around and 
pulled in behind and then I noticed a passenger in the 
vehicle. The passenger's door was open. I noticed the 
passenger standing outside by the rear trunk with a 
container of alcohol, beer, on the trunk of the car and the 
passenger was urinating. 
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I immediately then thought, "Well, it might be an 
alcohol violation." I called my dispatch, told them what I 
had. I then activated my overhead, my lights, my red and 
blue lights, got out of my vehicle and approached the 
driver's side. Mr. Davis was in the driver's side behind 
the wheel. The vehicle was off, it wasn't running, it was 
off. The keys were in the ignition. I then asked him if I 
could see his driver's license or some identification amd he 
told me that I didn't have the right. And I told him that I 
did and that I needed to see it. And he told me that he 
didn't have to show me a fucking thing because he was on 
private property and there was nothin' I could do about it. 
Q. And then what happened? 
A. Then the passenger handed me the registration card 
to the vehicle. I believe it was his vehicle. Handed me 
the registration card across from the passenger side through 
the driver's door. He didn't have his window down. He had 
Q | his door open. He handed it to me, didn't say a word and 1 
19 
2Q 
21 
22 
23 
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was very cooperative. I got that and then I asked again if 
I could see his driver's license and he said, "Fuck you," 
and slammed the door and took off driving. 
I then went back to my car, called it into dispatch, 
turned on ay siren and followed him, lights and siren, to 
where he turned in. LeGrande Spilsbury's home is right up 
here on the hill and there was like a little — some corrals 
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